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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

NIC 05374-84
19 September 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: Graham E. Fuller
National Intelligence Officer for NESA

SUBJECT: Qadhafi's Recent Political Moves: Is He Weaker Than
We Had Believed?

1. The recent French-Libyan agreement for mutual withdrawal of both parties from the Chad conflict comes as something of a surprise. A superficial examination of the agreement indicates it would deprive Qadhafi of the half of Chad over which he had established control. It represents an overall weakening of his position there.

-- Qadhafi can of course renege on the agreement--this is the second time he has withdrawn from Chad. In theory he could now step up subversion in southern Chad but he would be going for dubious long term gains as opposed to the concrete ones he already had.

2. It would seem questionable to attribute this withdrawal in Chad to the recent Libyan-Moroccan union, yet King Hassan has said that he would be able to "moderate" Libyan policy. Senior Algerian officials complained two weeks ago that France supported the Libyan-Moroccan union because the French believed it would lead to Qadhafi's withdrawal from Chad--and even the Algerians did not believe Qadhafi would pull out. But he did.

-- Interestingly, Syrian and Iranian dismay at the Libyan-Moroccan union would also suggest that it was hardly viewed as a breakthrough by radical forces in the Middle East.

3. The only reasonable explanation for this puzzling step by Qadhafi consistent with some of his other actions is that he is much more shaken by the May uprising in Tripoli than we had believed. Recent reporting

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